Suo Motu Jurisdiction of High Courts in Pakistan

Suo motu (Latin for “on its own motion”) refers to a court taking notice of a matter and initiating proceedings by itself, without a formal petition or external prompt. In Pakistan, the concept of suo motu is most commonly associated with the Supreme Court’s extraordinary original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, which allows the Supreme Court to act proprio motu in matters of public importance related to fundamental rights. However, High Courts do not enjoy a general constitutional power to initiate cases on their own accord in the same way. Article 199 (which defines High Courts’ writ jurisdiction) is explicitly worded to be invoked “on the application of an aggrieved party” (or person, in certain cases), implying that a High Court’s judicial review powers are triggered by a petition rather than by the court’s own motion. There is no clause in Article 199 analogous to Article 184(3) that would permit High Courts to act suo motu for enforcement of rights absent an application. On the contrary, the Constitution underscores in Article 175(2) that “No court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law”. Since no constitutional provision or law confers suo motu power on High Courts for general judicial review, it is understood that they cannot initiate writ proceedings on their own initiative.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that High Courts do not possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199. This principle was established as early as the 1950s and reiterated over the decades. In Tariq Transport Co. v. Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC 437), Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, interpreting the writ powers under the 1956 Constitution, observed that a High Court “is not competent, merely on information or of its own knowledge, to commence certiorari proceedings or other proceedings of a similar nature,” a petition or complaint is required to invoke such jurisdiction. Justice Shahabuddin in the same case noted that whenever a power to act suo motu exists, it is expressly given by statute (citing examples like certain revisional powers in civil and criminal procedure laws); by contrast, the constitutional writ jurisdiction contained no such enabling language. Likewise, under the 1962 Constitution, the Supreme Court in Shahnaz Begum v. Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677) held that a High Court cannot move of its own accord, since Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution (analogous to today’s Article 199) specified in each clause that orders were to be made “on the application of an aggrieved party or of any person”. Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman in that case emphasized that even for judicial review of executive action, the High Court could act only when moved by someone; it could not simply take notice of news or information and start inquiries on its own. The Supreme Court cautioned that courts must not be swayed by “sensational reports in newspapers” or matters outside the record, lest they encourage trial by media or invite doubts about judicial impartiality.

The definitive stance was reiterated in 1982 SCMR 549, where the Supreme Court declared: “It is settled law that in writ proceedings, the relief must be confined to the prayer made in the writ petition and the High Court cannot issue a writ suo motu.”. In other words, a High Court’s order cannot go beyond the scope of what the petitioner has sought, nor can the court on its own initiate a case or grant relief that no party requested. This view aligns with the general principle that the judiciary should not assume the role of a suitor in its own court. High Courts have adhered to this restriction in most cases, dismissing invitations to act on letters or mere news reports unless converted into a proper petition via someone’s application.

Despite the clear legal bar, there have been periods of judicial activism where individual High Court judges attempted to push the envelope. Following Pakistan’s judicial “restoration” movement in 2007–2009, an atmosphere of robust judicial intervention emerged. In the late 2000s, especially under Lahore High Court Chief Justice Khawaja Muhammad Sharif (circa 2009–2010), the Lahore High Court took up numerous matters suo motu in the public interest. These included cases of alleged medical negligence leading to death, unjustified hikes in public transport fares, the government’s cancellation of promotions of prison staff, a financial scandal (Zarco Exchange fraud), and even a sudden surge in sugar prices in the market. In those instances, the LHC’s bench initiated proceedings on its own notice of events (often based on media reports), aiming to protect citizens’ rights where the executive was seen as failing. Such actions were controversial; they were praised by some as necessary activism to check an inert executive, but criticized by others as exceeding judicial mandate and bypassing the “aggrieved person” requirement. Proponents argued that suo motu by High Courts provided relief for the poor and held officials accountable in real time. Critics warned that this trend undermined due process (citizens skipping normal legal channels, waiting instead for courts to intervene on their behalf) and overburdened courts that already faced heavy backlogs. By taking up matters on news reports, High Courts could also be seen as choosing some issues over others without clear criteria, raising fairness concerns. It also blurred the line between judicial and executive functions when courts ventured into resolving pricing or policy questions (e.g. setting sugar prices by judicial order).

It is important to note that even during this activist phase, there was usually some form of “trigger” for example, a letter to the court treated as a petition, or the court converting a pending matter into a broader inquiry. The judges justified these as extensions of their duty to do complete justice, though strictly speaking, it was an extraordinary departure from conservative practice. No statute authorized these suo motu actions; they were grounded in the judges’ interpretation of their inherent powers and moral duty, rather than clear legal text. The Supreme Court did not squarely endorse High Courts’ suo motu powers, and in fact occasionally cautioned restraint. Over time, as judicial policy shifted, High Courts largely returned to the orthodox position of requiring a filed petition by an aggrieved party to act.

In 2024, the Parliament decisively settled the matter by amending the Constitution. Through the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024, a new clause Article 199(1A) was inserted to “remove doubt” on this issue. It explicitly states: “The High Court shall not make an order or give any direction or make a declaration on its own or in the nature of suo motu exercise of jurisdiction beyond the contents of any application filed under clause (1).”. This amendment codifies the earlier judicial rule: a High Court’s orders must remain confined to the case and issues brought before it by a party’s application, and the court cannot go out on a frolic of its own. In simple terms, a High Court cannot initiate a case by itself, nor can it inject new issues or grant relief that was not sought by the petitioner. The 2024 amendment thus constitutionally prohibits suo motu action by High Courts, cementing the orthodox view into black-letter law. This came as part of a broader reform package aimed at recalibrating judicial powers and reducing friction between the judiciary and other branches.

In addition, the 26th Amendment introduced “Constitutional Benches” in High Courts (Article 202A) for certain sensitive cases, and even curtailed the Supreme Court’s unilateral suo motu powers by requiring that its Article 184(3) original jurisdiction be exercised by larger benches rather than by a single judge. These changes reflect a trend toward institutionalizing checks on judicial activism. As of 2025, therefore, it is firmly established that High Courts have no suo motu jurisdiction in Pakistan’s legal framework they act only when a litigant invokes their power under Article 199, and even then, the relief granted must relate to what that litigant has actually sought. Any de facto suo motu initiatives that do occur (for example, treating media reports as petitions) must be regularized by someone’s formal application to avoid running afoul of this constitutional limit. The High Courts remain potent forums for protecting rights and accountability, but they do so as neutral arbiters of disputes brought before them, not as roving inquisitors.